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A framework is presented to better characterize the role of individual differences in
information processing style and their interplay with contextual factors in determining
decision making quality. In Experiment 1, we show that individual differences in
information processing style are flexible and can be modified by situational factors.
Specifically, a situational manipulation that induced an analytical mode of thought
improved decision quality. In Experiment 2, we show that this improvement in decision
quality is highly contingent on the compatibility between the dominant thinking mode
and the nature of the task. That is, encouraging an intuitive mode of thought led to better
performance on an intuitive task but hampered performance on an analytical task. The
reverse pattern was obtained when an analytical mode of thought was encouraged.
We discuss the implications of these results for the assessment of decision making
competence, and suggest practical directions to help individuals better adjust their
information processing style to the situation at hand and make optimal decisions.
Keywords: biases, decision making competence, dual-process theory, individual differences, information
processing style, intuitive, rational, transitivity
Introduction
Studies in the ﬁeld of judgment and decision making (JDM) examine the processes underlying
choice behavior, and aim to help people make decisions and adapt strategies that better ﬁt the task
at hand. Traditionally, these studies were mainly centered on aggregated behavior that reﬂected
systematic biases and deviations from the normative benchmark (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky,
1973; Ariely, 2008). Although these studies provide valuable insights into the situational factors
aﬀecting the quality of decision making in general, it remains unclear how individual diﬀerences
inﬂuence decision making quality (Franken and Muris, 2005). Ample work has shown that
individual diﬀerences have pronounced eﬀects on choice behavior (Zakay, 1990; Yechiam et al.,
2005; Soane and Nicholson, 2008; Lauriola et al., 2014), risk perception (Kogan and Wallach,
1967), risk seeking and avoidance (Shaham et al., 1992) and binary guessing (Pruitt, 1961). Thus,
individual diﬀerences may be crucial to a better grasp of the factors inﬂuencing performance in
human decision making (Stanovich and West, 2000; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007, 2012).
The current paper examined the eﬀect of individual diﬀerences in information processing style
and the interplay between style and the nature of the task on choice quality. Classiﬁcations of
individual diﬀerences in information processing style typically categorize people as intuitive or
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analytical in their decision making processes (Epstein, 1994;
Sloman, 1996; Evans, 2003). As recent research has shown,
processing style has a marked eﬀect on decision quality (Shiloh
et al., 2002; Ayal et al., 2011, 2012; Rusou et al., 2013). For
example, Stanovich and West (2000) suggested that individual
diﬀerences are a key component in understanding the disparity
between optimal and actual performance. Zakay and colleagues
(Ayal et al., 2011, 2012; Rusou et al., 2013) found that individual
diﬀerences in processing styles directly inﬂuence decision quality.
The dual-system approach and its associated models (Epstein,
1994; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich and West, 2000; Evans, 2003)
posit that decision making is based on two distinct cognitive
mechanisms (thinking modes)1. While these dual-process models
may come in many ﬂavors, they all distinguish between
an intuitive mode that is assumed to be associative, quick,
unconscious, eﬀortless, and more error-prone, and an analytical
mode that is assumed to be slow, conscious, eﬀortful, and rule-
based. Kahneman (2003) later suggested the terms System 1 to
describe the intuitive thinking mode and System 2 to describe
the analytical mode. According to the traditional dual-system
approach, intuitive impressions are generated automatically, and
can be overridden by conscious, eﬀortful, deliberative reasoning.
Intuitive judgments are thus considered to directly reﬂect
impressions that are not modiﬁed by conscious deliberation
(Kahneman, 2003; Hogarth, 2005; Evans, 2008). Kahneman and
Frederick (2002) argued that erroneous intuitive judgments
arise from biased intuitive processes, and from lax monitoring
of System 2 that fails to correct these intuitive violations of
normative considerations (c.f. Kahneman, 2003). It is typically
assumed that people with a more analytical processing style
exhibit better decision making (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002;
Kahneman, 2011). In line with this claim, studies assessing
performance on numerical tasks have found that analytical rule-
based deliberation improves the accuracy and consistency of
computations compared to reliance on intuition (MacGregor
et al., 1988; MacGregor and Armstrong, 1994; McMackin and
Slovic, 2000; Beilock and Decaro, 2007; Rusou et al., 2013).
For instance, Mikels et al. (2013) showed that older adults
experiencing a decline in analytical abilities were more prone to
the ratio bias than their younger counterparts. Similarly, ﬁndings
have indicated that people high in analytical processing style
are less susceptible to decision biases (e.g., Banks and Oldﬁeld,
2007; Stanovich and West, 2008; Ayal et al., 2012). The analytical
thinking style was also found to be highly correlated with the
Adult Decision Making Competence scale, a reliable and valid
measure of decision quality (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007, 2012;
Bavol’ár and Orosová, 2015).
1Several scholars have questioned the theoretical coherence as well as the evidence
for the existence of two systems and suggested alternatives to the two-system
approach (e.g., Reyna, 2004; Keren and Schul, 2009; Strough et al., 2011). For
instance, Wastell (2014) argued that human reasoning consists of a multitude of
modules that interact via dynamical emergent processes based on information
input and output requirements. Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011) proposed a
uniﬁed theoretical approach to both intuitive and deliberative judgments, and
claimed that both are rule-based and the issue is how the rules are selected. They
suggested that rules are selected by the task itself and the individual’s memory
constraints (for a recent response see Evans and Stanovich, 2013).
Despite the common belief that analytical thinking results in
optimal decisions and intuitive thinking leads to biases, recent
studies have found no correlation between biased decisions and
intuitive thinking style (Ayal et al., 2011, 2012). In addition,
recent research has also identiﬁed speciﬁc cases in which the use
of analytical thinking can facilitate biased behavior (Dijksterhuis
and Nordgren, 2006; Ayal and Hochman, 2009)2 whereas
intuitive thinking can lead to more accurate and consistent
decisions (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Acker, 2008; Glöckner and
Herbold, 2011; Usher et al., 2011).
These apparently conﬂicting results may stem from the
dominant trend in previous research to examine information
processing style (more intuitive vs. more analytical) in isolation
from contextual factors such as the nature of the task. To assess
decision quality, researchers frequently use decision problems
that have a clear normative criterion (e.g., a criterion based
on Bayes’ theorem to investigate base-rate problems; Bar-Hillel,
1980). These decision problems are rule-based in nature and
hence are an advantage for analytical thinkers. However, decision
problems that are more intuitive in nature might yield a diﬀerent
pattern of results and under certain conditions could beneﬁt
intuitive thinkers. As Sloman (2002) pointed out: “The two
thinking modes are specialists at diﬀerent kinds of problems. One
system may be able to mimic the computation performed by the
other, but only with eﬀort and ineﬃciency, and even then not
necessarily reliably” (p. 383).
In the current work, we suggest a more integrative approach
and argue that both analytical and intuitive information
processing style have the potential to lead to optimal decisions.
However, the extent to which this potential can be tapped
depends not only on the tendency to use a certain thinking style,
but also on situational factors that prompt people to rely on a
speciﬁc thinking mode (Finucane et al., 2000; Epstein, 2007).
We demonstrate this ﬂexibility in Experiment 1 by showing
that decision quality can be improved by instructing participants
to engage in an analytical mode of thought regardless of their
information processing style. In Experiment 2, we examine
whether this potential to improve decision quality depends on the
compatibility between the decision maker’s dominant processing
style and the nature of the task.
The Flexibility of Information Processing Style
Individuals’ relative reliance on the analytical or intuitive
thinking mode during a decision task is determined by a
combination of factors, including individual diﬀerences in
information processing styles, task characteristics and situational
factors (Stanovich and West, 2002; Epstein, 2007). In turn, the
dominant thinking mode that governs choices aﬀects decision
quality (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Bavol’ár and Orosová, 2015).
For example, Ayal et al. (2011, 2012) showed that people low in
analytical processing style were more prone to behavioral biases.
At the same time, relative reliance on processing style is also
2Several researchers have reported diﬃculties in directly replicating the eﬀect of the
superiority of unconscious intuitive thinking as reported by Dijksterhuis and his
colleagues; other studies have shown that the superiority of unconscious intuitive
thinking is in fact contingent on other variables (for a review seeAcker, 2008; Payne
et al., 2008; Nieuwenstein et al., 2015).
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determined by situational factors. For example, time constraints
(Zakay and Wooler, 1984) and cognitive load (Hoﬀmann et al.,
2013) have been found to facilitate the use of more intuitive
thinking, whereas negative aﬀect tends to elicit the use of more
analytical thinking (Schwarz and Clore, 1987). These ﬁndings
suggest that over and beyond individual diﬀerences, certain
situational factors can also promote the use of one thinking mode
rather than another.
Experimental manipulations aimed at encouraging a more
analytical or intuitive mode of thought have been found to
directly inﬂuence performance on decision tasks (Dijksterhuis,
2004; Usher et al., 2011; Rusou et al., 2013). For instance,
Thomas and Millar (2011) demonstrated that the framing eﬀect
was reduced when participants were encouraged to “think like
a scientist.” Similarly, Hammond et al. (1987) reported that
experienced highway engineers made better judgments when the
properties of the task matched the mode of thinking that was
used.
Based on this theoretical rationale we formulated a ﬂexibility
hypothesis; namely, that decision making quality is inﬂuenced
by individuals’ information processing style. Speciﬁcally, we
predicted that participants high in analytical information
processing style should be less susceptible to cognitive biases than
participants low in analytical processing. However, due to the
eﬀect of situational factors, the decision quality should be further
improved even for low analytical participants by encouraging a
more analytical mode of thought. We tested this hypothesis in
Experiment 1.
The Compatibility between Thinking Style and
the Task at Hand
Compatibility is a crucial factor in understanding human
decision making (Selart, 1997). For example, research has shown
that stimulus-response compatibility plays an important role
in optimizing the relationship between technology and human
operators (Kantowitz et al., 1990; Kornblum et al., 1990).
Reaction time and accuracy are improved when responses are
compatible with the stimuli (Fitts and Seeger, 1953; Ayal and
Beyth-Marom, 2014) or the information at hand (Hochman et al.,
2010; Glöckner and Hochman, 2011). Similarly, compatibility
between input and output is an important factor in people’s
reasoning and decision making abilities (Shaﬁr, 1995; Selart,
1996). Thus, we argue that choice quality is determined not only
by the extent of reliance on each thinking mode, but also on the
compatibility between the thinking style and the task at hand
(Sternberg, 1999; c.f. McMackin and Slovic, 2000).
The importance of the task characteristics was ﬁrst introduced
by Hammond et al. (1987) who claimed that tasks are
arranged on a continuum from those compatible with analytical
deliberation to those compatible with intuition. According to
Hammond et al. (1987), analytical tasks are characterized by
a quantitative presentation, objective measures, and a readily
available organizing principle. In contrast, the characteristics of
intuitive tasks include high familiarity, a pictorial presentation,
a subjective measure, and the unavailability of an organizing
principle or algorithm to integrate cues (c.f. Epstein, 1994;
Hogarth, 2005). In line with these notions, McMackin and
Slovic (2000) showed that an intuitive thinking mode enhances
performance on tasks that are intuitive in nature, whereas
an analytical mode enhances performance on analytical tasks.
However, these authors used completely diﬀerent evaluation
criteria for the quality of intuitive and analytical tasks which
precluded testing for interactions between thinking mode and
task.
This led to our compatibility hypothesis; namely, that decision
making quality is inﬂuenced by the compatibility between the
dominant thinking mode used for the decision and the nature of
the task. Therefore, we predicted an interaction eﬀect such that a
manipulation that induces an analytical mode of thought should
lead to higher decision quality when the nature of the task is
analytical, and an intuitive mode of thought should lead to higher
decision quality when the nature of the task is intuitive. We tested
this hypothesis in Experiment 2.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed to examine how individual
diﬀerences in processing styles aﬀect the quality of people’s
decisions. In addition, we tested our ﬂexibility hypothesis that
this eﬀect is sensitive to manipulations promoting a speciﬁc
thinking mode. Based on previous ﬁndings (Ayal et al., 2011,
2012) and speciﬁcally the analytical nature of the task, we
hypothesized that people high in analytical processing style would
be more calibrated to normative considerations (i.e., less prone to
cognitive biases in their decisions) than people low on analytical
style. However, based on the same ﬁndings and the nature of
task, we predicted no correlation between intuitive thinking style
and calibration. Moreover, according to our ﬂexibility hypothesis,
we also expected that encouraging an analytical thinking mode
(versus an intuitive mode) would further improve decision
making.
Method
Participants
Eighty-one undergraduate students from the Interdisciplinary
Center (IDC) Herzliya (41 female, Mean age = 25.9 years,
SD = 2.71) volunteered to participate in the study as part of their
academic requirements in return for credit hours. All participants
were native Hebrew speakers. The participants signed a consent
form at the beginning of the experiment, and were debriefed at
the end of the third stage.
Design and Procedure
We employed a 2 (processing style: analytical and intuitive) × 2
(mode of thought: analytical vs. intuitive) between-participants
design. The experimental procedure was comprised of three
stages. The ﬁrst stage consisted of the 24-item Rational
Experiential Inventory (REI) questionnaire (Pacini and Epstein,
1999) translated into Hebrew and validated in previous studies
(Ayal et al., 2011, 2012). The REI is a self-report inventory that
assesses individuals’ tendencies to include analytical and intuitive
considerations in their decision making processes. It consists of
two unipolar scales (12 items each) which rank participants on
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two dimensions of information processing style. The ﬁrst scale
measures engagement in and favorability of cognitive activities
and corresponds to a rational-analytic information processing
style (e.g., I have a logical mind). The second scale measures
engagement in and favorability of experiential activities and
corresponds to an intuitive processing style (e.g., When it comes
to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings).
Participants are required to state how true each statement is
for them, on a scale from 1 (Deﬁnitely False) to 5 (Deﬁnitely
True). Research has shown that the internal consistency reliability
coeﬃcient for each scale is high (usually above 0.85) whereas
the correlation between them is small and negligible (Pacini and
Epstein, 1999; Ayal et al., 2011). Thus, the REI is assumed to
support Epstein’s (1994) claim of two independent information
processing systems.
The second stage of the experiment consisted of the mode of
thought manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to
one of two experimental conditions (analytical vs. intuitive mode
of thought). Based on Usher et al.’s (2011) “declared” procedure,
mode of thought was manipulated by informing participants
about the “proven beneﬁts” of decisions based on a speciﬁc
thinking mode. Participants in the intuitive group were told that
“Research has shown that the best decisions are the ones made
using intuition” and were encouraged to base their evaluation
on their “gut-feeling” and general impressions. Participants in
the analytical group were told that “Research has shown that
the best decisions are the ones made using logic and analytical
thought” and were encouraged to think carefully and logically
about their choices (Usher et al., 2011). No time limitations were
imposed.
Finally, to assess decision quality, the third stage was made
up of six prototypical questions used to examine adherence to
biased thinking. All questions were presented in a random order.
The six biases included in this stage were the ratio bias (Denes-
Raj et al., 1995), proportion dominance (Fetherstonhaugh et al.,
1997), irrational diversiﬁcation (Ayal and Zakay, 2009), debt-
account aversion (Amar et al., 2011), the gambler’s fallacy
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974),
and the “hot hand eﬀect” (Gilovich et al., 1985). For instance,
one question examined the ratio bias; i.e., the tendency to judge a
low probability event as more likely when presented as a large
numbered ratio (e.g., 9/100) than as a smaller-numbered but
equal or better ratio (e.g., 1/10). This eﬀect is attributed to a
tendency to focus on the frequency of the numerator instead
of the overall proportion (Miller et al., 1989; Kirkpatrick and
Epstein, 1992). In this case, a choice that reﬂects a preference
for the 9/100 ratio over the 1/10 ratio was classiﬁed as a bias.
All questions were adapted from their original papers. The full
questionnaire and its scoring method are presented in Appendix
A. The Ethics Committee of IDC approved this study.
Results
Before testing our hypotheses, we assessed the reliability and
validity of the REI questionnaire. First, we calculated the
reliability of the REI scale using Cronbach’s alpha coeﬃcient. As
predicted by the dual system approach, we found high internal
consistency for the analytical (Cronbach’s α = 0.88) and the
intuitive (Cronbach’s α = 0.90) scale. In addition, no correlation
was found between the two scales (r = −0.008, p = 0.946).
Next, we examined whether participants exhibited judgment
biases. To do so, we coded each response that was predicted by the
normative solution as “1,” and each response that was predicted
by the corresponding bias as “0.” Then, we calculated the average
percentage of biases for each participant according to the formula
(number of biased responses/6) ∗ 100 (Cronbach’s α= 0.29). This
analysis revealed that on average, participants exhibited biased
thinking 52.47% of the time (SD = 21.43).
To test the relationship between the thinking mode and
quality of decisions, we used a simultaneous regression analysis.
Speciﬁcally, the analytical and intuitive scales (as a continuous
variable) and the mode of thought (as a binary variable, with
analytical mode coded as 0 and intuitive mode coded as 1) were
entered into the model to assess the eﬀect of these factors on
overall bias adherence as a dependent variable. The results of
this analysis are summarized in Table 1. As can be seen from
the table, the overall model was signiﬁcant [adjusted R2 = 0.10,
F(3,77) = 4.121, p < 0.01]. Mode of thought was positively but
marginally associated with biased results (b = 0.216, p = 0.055).
Since an analytical mode of thought was coded as 0 and intuitive
as 1, this result suggests that in this task, asking people to provide
a more analytical decision resulted in fewer biases than asking
them to provide a more intuitive response.
In line with previous research (Ayal et al., 2011, 2012), there
was a negative relationship between analytical thinking style and
adherence to biases (β = −0.227, p < 0.05), and no association
between biased behavior and intuitive thinking style (β = 0.125,
p = 0.26, n.s.). Based on these ﬁndings, in the following analyses
we focused only on the analytical scale, and examined adherence
to biases separately for participants who were found to be high
or low on the analytical scale (based on the median split) as
a function of the mode of thought. The results of this analysis
are presented in Figure 1 and summarized in Table 2. As can
be seen in the ﬁgure, participants high in analytical processing
style exhibited fewer biases (M = 46.7%, SD = 18.2) than
low analytical participants (M = 58.1%, SD = 23). Similarly,
participants in the analytic mode of thought condition were
less prone to biases (M = 46.7%, SD = 21.1) than participants
TABLE 1 | Relationship between mode of thought and thinking styles (REI)
and overall bias adherence as the dependent variable.
Regression model
Variables Beta (standardized
coefficients)
t Significance
Mode of thought 0.216 1.949 0.055
Analytical scale −0.227 −2.135 0.036
Intuitive scale 0.125 1.129 0.226
Model fit
Adjusted R2 0.105
F 4.121∗∗
Df 3, 77
N = 81, ∗∗p < 0.01.
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FIGURE 1 | Effects of individual differences in analytical information
processing style and manipulated thinking mode on susceptibility to
biases.
TABLE 2 | Overall mean percentage of bias adherence in the two mode of
thought conditions of Experiment 1, as a function of the level of analytical
processing style.
Analytical processing style
Mode of thought Low High Overall
Analytical 50.87 (23.22) 43.18 (19.01) 46.74 (21.15)∗
Intuitive 64.39 (21.39) 50.93 (16.64) 58.33 (20.32)∗
Overall 58. 30 (23.01)∗ 46.66 (18.18)∗ 52.47 (21.43)
SD appears in parentheses. ∗Represents a significant difference (p < 0.05).
in the intuitive mode of thought condition (M = 58.3%,
SD = 20.3). A two-way ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect for
level of analytical processing style [F(1,77) = 5.480, p < 0.03],
as well as for mode of thought [F(1,77) = 5.53, p < 0.03].
No signiﬁcant interaction was found between the two factors
[F(1,77) = 0.408, n.s.].
This pattern of results supports our hypothesis that individual
diﬀerences in analytical processing style aﬀect the quality of
decisions, such that low analytical participants are more prone
to cognitive biases than high analytical participants. In addition,
the results also support the ﬂexibility hypothesis by showing that
inducing an analytical mode of thought can further improve
decision quality.
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 supported the ﬂexibility hypothesis
and suggested that adherence to biased behavior depends on
individuals’ analytical processing style, but can also be improved
when an analytical mode of thought is induced. Experiment 2 was
designed to test the compatibility hypothesis and examine whether
the eﬀect of thinking mode on decision quality is contingent
on the nature of the task (Rusou et al., 2013). Speciﬁcally,
we hypothesized that the advantage of analytic thinking in
Experiment 1 was due to the choice of task, which was analytical
in nature. In Experiment 2 we examined the eﬀect of the
interaction between thinking mode and the nature of the task on
decision quality. Based on the theoretical framework presented
above, we predicted that inducing an analytical thinking mode
would improve performance on an analytical task, whereas
encouraging an intuitive mode of thought would improve
performance on a task that was more intuitive in nature.
For the analytical task, we used arithmetic multiplication. This
task was chosen because it is abstract and symbolic, and can
be evaluated objectively by applying well-deﬁned mathematical
rules to ﬁnd or estimate the answer. Hence, it is compatible with
the characteristics of analytical thinking as logical (rule-based),
abstract (i.e., encoding reality in abstract symbols, words, and
numbers) and emotion-free (Payne et al., 1993). For the intuitive
task, we used a task that required participants to assess faces on
repeated trials. Previous studies have characterized impression
formation from facial appearance as a holistic process that occurs
rapidly, eﬀortlessly, and spontaneously (Todorov and Uleman,
2003). Therefore, this kind of task is considered intuitive in
nature (c.f., Epstein, 1994; Lieberman et al., 2002; Hogarth, 2005;
Evans, 2008; Rusou et al., 2013).
To determine decision quality, we calculated the number of
transitivity violations made by the participants. The principle
of transitivity implies that for any three alternatives (A, B, C),
if A is judged as better than B, and B is judged as better
than C, then A should also be judged as better than C (von
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Hence, if there is no error in
decision making (or if it is very low), individuals will evaluate
the diﬀerent alternatives in a consistent way every time and
will exhibit no (or very few) violations of transitivity in this
pairwise choice paradigm (Lee et al., 2009). We chose transitivity
as a dependent measure, since it is deﬁned as one of the
foundations of rationality. As stressed by Gilovich and Griﬃn
(2010): “Transitivity is one of the axioms and principles that one’s
choices must follow in order to ensure that one maximizes overall
utility.” In addition, since this criterion could be used to evaluate
both the analytical and intuitive task, it enabled us to test our
compatibility hypothesis directly.
Method
Participants
Forty undergraduate students (32 females,Mean age= 22.6 years,
SD = 1.84) from the IDC Herzliya, Israel volunteered to
participate in this study as part of their academic requirements
in return for credit hours. All participants were native Hebrew
speakers. The participants signed a consent form at the beginning
of the experiment, and were debriefed at the end of the third
stage.
Stimulus Material
Evaluations of arithmetic multiplications were examined on eight
multiplications in which a single-digit number was multiplied by
a two-digit number (in each pair). Using all eight multiplications,
28 pairs were presented to the participants by creating all possible
pairwise combinations of the multiplications (8X7/2 = 28).
Within each pair, the multiplications were centered horizontally
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in the middle of the screen, with the digit “1” displayed under the
left-hand multiplication and the digit “2” under the right-hand
multiplication (see Figure 2 for an example). The choice criterion
“Which of the multiplications looks larger to you?” was presented
above each pair in the upper middle part of the screen. The term
“looks” was used to avoid directing participants to any speciﬁc
mode of thought.
Similarly, face assessments were examined by using eight
color photographs of male faces. Twenty-eight pairs were formed
by creating all possible pairwise combinations of the faces
(8X7/2 = 28). As with the multiplications, within each pair, the
faces were centered horizontally in the middle of the screen, with
the digit “1” displayed under the left-hand face and the digit “2”
under the right-hand face (see Figure 2 for an example). The
choice criterion “Which of the faces looks nicer to you?” was
presented above each pair in the upper middle part of the screen.
Design and Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions,
in a 2 (thinking mode: intuitive vs. analytical) × 2 (choice task:
multiplications, facial impression formation) between-subjects
design.
The experimental procedure was made up of two
stages. The ﬁrst stage consisted of the mode of thought
manipulation. This stage was identical to the mode of thought
manipulation in Experiment 1. The second stage consisted of
the multiplication/face assessment task. In both conditions,
participants were told “In a moment, you will be presented with
pairs of multiplications/photographed faces. Each individual
multiplication/face might appear several times; however, each
combination of multiplication/faces will be presented only once.
Within each pair, you will be asked to choose the multiplication
that looks larger/face that looks nicer to you, by selecting the
number displayed under that multiplication/face.” Following the
initial instructions, the 28 pairs of multiplications/faces were
presented to participants in a random order.
In the analytical condition, after the presentation of each pair,
and before making their choice, participants were presented with
the following two questions (one for each pair): (a) “Please specify
your reasons for evaluating how large the multiplication in 1 is
[nice the Face in 1 is]”; and (b) “Please specify your reasons for
evaluating how large the multiplication in 2 is [nice the Face
in 2 is].” Participants were required to write their responses in
a text box. The questions were presented one at a time, in the
same order on each trial. These questions were presented to make
FIGURE 2 | An example of one pair of stimuli from each of the tasks
used in Experiment 2.
sure that participants in this condition would use more analytical
processing (Wilson and Schooler, 1991).
Each selection of a multiplication/face was followed by a blank
screen, and then the next pair of multiplications/faces appeared.
Each participant was tested individually in a small room. After
responding to all 28 pairs, participants were debriefed and
thanked. The Ethics Committee of the IDC approved this study.
Results and Discussion
The number of transitivity violations was calculated for each
participant by counting the number of three-way cycles
of transitivity violations (e.g., for each sub-group of three
multiplications/faces x, y, and z, x ≥ y, y ≥ z, and z ≥ x)
committed by participants (for a detailed explanation of this
method, see Lee et al., 2009).
Figure 3 depicts the mean number of transitivity violations
in the multiplication evaluation and face assessment tasks as
a function of mode of thought. In line with the compatibility
hypothesis, a 2 (thinking mode: analytical vs. intuitive) × 2
(task type: multiplications vs. faces) between-subjects ANOVA
on the transitivity violations showed a signiﬁcant interaction
eﬀect between thinking mode and task type [F(1,38) = 7.88,
p < 0.01]. Planned comparisons further revealed that in the
analytic (multiplication evaluation) task, participants who were
encouraged to adhere to an analytic mode of thought committed
signiﬁcantly fewer transitivity violations (M = 4.7, SD = 3.36)
than those who were encouraged to think intuitively [M = 8.2,
SD = 4.05; t(18) = 2.10, p < 0.05]. By contrast, in the intuitive
(face assessment) task, participants who were encouraged to think
intuitively committed signiﬁcantly fewer transitivity violations
(M = 0.4, SD = 0.7) than participants who were encouraged
to use a more analytical mode of thought [M = 2.5, SD = 3.4;
t(18) = 1.90, p< 0.05]3. These results are summarized in Table 3.
3This pattern of results was replicated in another experiment that only
implemented the face assessment task (n = 20). Face assessments were examined
with nine color photographs of male faces. 36 pairs were formed by creating all
possible pairwise combinations of the faces (9X87/2 = 36). The experimental
FIGURE 3 | The mean number of transitivity violations as a function of
task and mode of thought.
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Importantly, since mathematical multiplications are rule-
based, it was important to control whether this measure of
transitivity was related to accuracy. Hence, we also calculated
the percentage of correct choices on this task. This analysis
showed that accuracy paralleled the pattern obtained by using
transitivity violations. A t-test for independent samples indicated
that participants who were encouraged to adhere to an analytical
mode of thought were signiﬁcantly more accurate in their
mathematical choices (M = 0.68, SD= 0.18) than those who were
encouraged to think intuitively [M = 0.56, SD= 0.13; t(18)= 1.7,
p = 0.05, one-tailed].
These ﬁndings support our compatibility hypothesis that
decision quality depends on the compatibility between the
dominant thinking mode used for making the decision and the
nature of the task at hand. Inducing a more analytical thinking
mode led tomore consistency (and thus to better decisions) when
the task required more analytical skills, but to less consistency
when the task required more intuitive skills. Inducing an intuitive
mode of thought led to more consistency when the task required
intuition and to less consistency when it required more analytical
skills. In both cases, the improvement in choice was observed in
the compatible conditions when there was a good ﬁt between the
thinking mode and the nature of the task.
General Discussion
Proponents of dual-process decision models suggest that
information processing style, an individual tendency which
determines to what extent decisions rely on intuitive and
analytical processes (Denes-Raj et al., 1995), is a main factor
in decision quality. Traditionally, dual-process decision models
have assumed that biased behavior stems from erroneous
intuitive processes and a failure of analytical processes to govern
behavior (e.g., Kahneman, 2003, 2011). However, recent research
has found no correlation between intuitive processing style and
biased behavior (Ayal et al., 2011, 2012). Moreover, it has been
shown that under certain conditions, intuitive thinking can lead
to decisions that are better than decisions based on analytical
procedure was identical to the procedure in Experiment 2. Participants in the
intuitive mode of thought condition were more consistent between choices
(M = 0.8, SD= 1.23) than participants in the analytical mode of thought condition
(M = 2.2, SD = 2.15). A t-test for independent samples indicated that this
diﬀerence was signiﬁcant [t(18) = −1.78, p< 0.05, one-tailed].
TABLE 3 | Mean transitivity violations as a function of the task and mode
of thought in Experiment 2.
Task
Mode of
thought
Facial
impressions
Math
multiplications
Overall
Analytical 2.5 (3.40)∗ 4.7 (3.37)∗ 3.6 (3.48)
Intuitive 0.4 (0.70)∗ 8.2 (4.05)∗ 4.3 (4.9)
Overall 1.45 (2.62) 6.45 (4.05) 3.95 (4.21)
SD appears in parentheses. ∗Represents a significant difference (p < 0.05).
thinking (Wilson and Schooler, 1991; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006;
Rusou et al., 2013).
To account for this apparent contradiction between empirical
ﬁndings and the theoretical claims of the dual system approach,
we put forward a ﬂexible-compatible information processing
style framework which posits that decision quality is not merely
the result of individual diﬀerences in information processing
style. Rather, the dominant style of thinking (that is, the type
of processes activated during decision making) is determined
by both personal tendencies and situational factors. Both
intuitive and analytical processing styles can lead to optimal
decisions. However, this potential is ﬂexible. To what extent it
is realized depends considerably on the compatibility between
the dominant thinking style and the characteristics of the task.
Analytical thinking (which is dominant among individuals
high on this processing style or under situational factors that
encourage this processing style) will lead to better performance
on tasks that are analytical in nature. By contrast, on tasks which
require more intuitive skills, an intuitive processing style will be
more advantageous.
Two experiments were presented to examine this framework.
In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that the eﬀect of information
processing style is ﬂexible and can thus be modiﬁed. As in
previous research, we found that individuals high in analytical
processing style were less prone to biases than individuals low
in analytical processing. However, as suggested by our ﬂexibility
hypothesis, encouraging an analytical mode of thought further
improved decision quality in individuals both low and high in
analytical information processing style. In addition, similar to
previous studies (Ayal et al., 2011, 2012), in Experiment 1 there
was no correlation between the intuitive scale of the REI and
decision quality. This latter ﬁnding supports our compatibility
assertion, as it suggests that intuitive processing style might
not play a major role in analytical tasks. It also suggests that
susceptibility to cognitive biases in well-known JDM tasks (e.g.,
the Ratio Bias, the Gambler’s Fallacy) mainly depends on the level
of analytical thinking.
Further direct evidence for the compatibility hypothesis was
found in Experiment 2, where participants were given either
an analytical or an intuitive task. Improvement in decision
quality (indexed by transitivity of choice behavior) was obtained
by encouraging an analytical or intuitive mode of thought,
depending on the nature of the task. That is, encouraging
an intuitive mode of thought (compared to analytical) led to
better performance on the intuitive-pictorial task but hampered
performance on the analytical-numerical task. The opposite
pattern was obtained when we encouraged an analytical thinking
mode. Presumably, when the nature of the task requires intuitive
skills, analytical and deliberative thinking may reduce decision
quality (Wilson and Schooler, 1991; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006;
Rusou et al., 2013). However, using intuition and relying more
on gut feelings in such cases can lead to better choices (see also
McMackin and Slovic, 2000; Rusou et al., 2013).
The current results also have important methodological
implications. Decision-making research is based on comparing
human choice to a normative benchmark derived from formal
statistics and probability theories, logical thinking and rationality
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(for a review see Kahneman et al., 1982; Gilovich et al., 2002). As
a result, most tools that are aimed at evaluating decision quality
are based on analytical problems with an optimal solution that
can be solved by implementing a normative model (e.g., A-DMC,
Frederick, 2005; Peters et al., 2006; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).
Our results suggest thatmeasures of decision making competence
should not be solely based on analytical tasks that require logical
or numerical skills, but also on intuitive tasks. Diﬀerent types of
tasks may better represent the wide range of decision tasks faced
in real life situations.
Finally, from a practical point of view, our framework suggests
that individuals and organizations should pay special attention
not only to how decisions are made (i.e., based on analytical or
intuitive processes), but also what type of thinking is required for
the speciﬁc tasks at hand. Encouraging compatibility between the
dominant thinking mode and the nature of the task is a crucial
aspect of decision making quality. This is true for recruiting
processes, as well as for the design of a working environment that
can encourage a compatible thinking mode for each task. Most
importantly, people should be constantly reminded that decision
making style is ﬂexible, and that an adaptive decision maker
should have more than one mode of thought in her decision
making toolbox. Thus, with proper training, policy makers can
help people adjust their thinking style to the situation at hand,
strengthen the weaker aspects of their thinking style, and realize
their full potential to make optimal decisions.
Limitations and Future Directions
This study examined the eﬀects of processing style on the
quality of judgment and decisions, both by measuring individual
diﬀerences in the tendency to think more analytically or more
intuitively and by explicitly manipulating the dominant mode
of thought. However, the measure we used to assess individual
diﬀerences in thinking styles (REI) is only one of several (see
for example, Scott and Bruce, 1995) and there are other ways of
inducing a speciﬁc thinking mode (e.g., Pham, 2004; Lee et al.,
2009). Similarly, our dependent measure assessing the quality
of decisions was based on a set of well-known decision making
tasks that cover diﬀerent features of decisions. However, the
internal consistency between them was low, which might limit
the generalizability of our results. Thus, in future research a more
standardized tool should be used to assess well-deﬁned facets
of decision making (e.g., A-DMC, Frederick, 2005; Peters et al.,
2006; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). In addition, ﬂexibility of
processing style was only demonstrated for the analytical scale.
Examining the ﬂexibility of the intuitive style would thus be an
important step for future research. For example, Experiment 2
could be replicated with the addition of measuring individual
diﬀerences in processing style to examine whether encouraging
an intuitive mode of thought could further improve performance
on intuitive tasks. It would be useful to include control groups
that are not administered mode of thought manipulations.
Second, the sample size in Experiment 2 was relatively
small. Although the ﬁndings for one condition were replicated,
and the overall pattern of results adhere to previous research
(e.g., Rusou et al., 2013), it is important to replicate the
current ﬁndings with larger sample sizes. Third, Experiment
2 implemented both intuitive and analytical tasks that were
compared using the same normative criterion (i.e., transitivity).
However, the higher number of transitivity violations under the
math multiplication task compared to the facial impression task
(across the manipulation conditions) raises a concern that these
two tasks diﬀered in diﬃculty level. Thus, a challenge for future
research is to identify tasks which require either analytical or
intuitive skills that are balanced for diﬃculty level.
Finally, the majority of our participants in Experiment 2
were females (80%), a fact that might limit the generalizability
of our results to more heterogeneous samples. For instance, some
research that has investigated the relationship between gender
and information processing styles has found that females may
be higher in intuitive thinking whereas males may be higher in
deliberative thinking (e.g., Pacini and Epstein, 1999; Gigerenzer
et al., 2014). In contrast, other studies found no gender
diﬀerences in thinking styles (Delaney et al., 2015), and some have
pointed out that females tend to perform as well or even better
than males on mathematical tests (Hyde et al., 1990; Bridgeman
and Wendler, 1991; Stout et al., 2011). Thus, the eﬀect of gender
on the relationship between thinking mode and performance
on diﬀerent types of tasks should be further examined. It would
be useful to test whether gender groups diﬀer not only in their
dominant thinking mode, but also in the malleability of this
mode, and its adaptation to diﬀerent types of decisions.
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